Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2004

The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine
Louis Michael Seidman
Georgetown University Law Center, seidman@law.georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/563

37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 441-480 (2004)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons

THE SECRET LIFE OF THE POLITICAL
QUESTION DOCTRINE
LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN·

"Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be
. made in this court."l
The irony, of course, is that Marbury v. Madison, itself,
"made" a political question, and the answer the Court gave was
deeply political as well. As everyone reading this essay knows, the
case arose out of a bitter political controversy,2 and the opinion for
the Court was a carefully crafted political document-"a
masterwork of indirection," according to Robert McCloskey's wellknown characterization, "a brilliant example of Chief Justice
Marshall's capacity to sidestep danger while seemingly to court it,
to advance in one direction while his opponents are looking in
another. ,,3
The purpose of this essay is to explore the many layers of this
irony. I will argue that despite all of the premature reports of its
demise, the political question doctrine is as central to modern
• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to Lama
Abu-Odeh, Vicki Jackson, Neal Katyal, Michael Klarman, Roy Schotland,
David Seidman, and Mark Tushnet for comments on a previous version of this
article and to Moneen Nasmith for outstanding research assistance.
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
2. The case came about because of last minute efforts by the defeated
Federalists to retain control of the federal judiciary after their defeat in the
election of 1800. (The behavior of Federalist judges, especially their
enforcement of the controversial Alien and Sedition Acts, had been an issue in
the election). In the immediate wake of the election, the Federalist Congress
established six circuit courts with sixteen additional judges to be appointed by
the outgoing administration. In addition, President Adams appointed fortytwo new justices of the peace for Alexandria and the District of Columbia, one
of whom was Marbury. The commissions were to be delivered by the
Secretary of State - none other than John Marshall, who was serving in this
post while also Chief Justice of the United States. Marshall failed to deliver
the commission for Marbury and, when the incoming Jefferson administration
refused to provide him with the commission, Marbury sued. For
standard
accounts of these events, see James M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV.
219 (1992); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison,
1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 1-5.
3. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 25 (3d ed.
2000).
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constitutional adjudication as it was to the outcome in Marbury at
the beginning of our constitutional history. Moreover, the irony at
Marbury's core continues to haunt the doctrine two hundred years
later. Now, as then, application of the doctrine requires courts to
resolve political questions-the very activity the doctrine purports
to avoid. Now, as then, this contradiction mocks Chief Justice
Marshall's confident assertion that "[i]f some acts be examinable,
and others not, there must be some rule of law to guide the court
in the exercise of its jurisdiction."4 As we shall see, the effort to
make the political question problem into a "doctrine"5-to bound it
by a rule of law-is a fool's errand. The difficulty posed by
political question jurisprudence is not that the court has
sometimes politicized law, but that it has never successfully
legalized politics.
My argument should not be confused with the claim that the
Court is often influenced by politics in the partisan sense,
although I must confess that it is hard to extinguish the suspicion
that this claim may have been true in 1803, when Marbury was
decided and may remain true in our own day. For purposes ofthis
paper, however, I mean nothing more by "politics" than a set of
criteria for decisionmaking that are outside the domain of
constitutional law. My argument, then, is that the Court has
never-and never can-develop constitutional rules that control
the political judgments, as so understood, that it regularly makes. 6
Moreover, because political questions operate outside of
constitutional law, the political question doctrine must lead a
secret life. In theory, the Court's abstention from deciding
political questions insulates judges from politics so that they can
resolve legal disputes. In fact, a proper understanding of the
doctrine fatally undermines Marshall's famous claim that "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.,,7
It might be thought, therefore, that the political question
doctrine supports Marbury's modern critics, who would vest
constitutional interpretation exclusively in the political branches.
It turns out that even though the doctrine undermines Marbury's
reasoning, it also weakens the argument of Marbury's opponents.
In short, the political question doctrine is the most dangerous
4. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165.
5. For convenience, I will abandon the scarequotes in the remainder of this
essay. It should be understood nonetheless that I mean to problematize the
"doctrinal" character of the political question doctrine.
6. In this sense, my position differs from Mark Tushnet's. See Mark V.
Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation
and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203
(2002). I share Tushnet's view that the Court has attempted to doctrinalize
political questions. We seem to differ about whether it has succeeded.
7. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
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concept in all of constitutional law. Despite heroic efforts from all
quarters to domesticate it, the doctrine has merely remained
underground, from whence it continues to lash out in all
s
directions.
My argument for and elaboration of these conclusions will be
organized as follows: the aim of Part One is to disentangle three
strands of the doctrine. My claim here is that two of the three
strands are relatively unimportant 'because they are really
disguised legal decisions about the merits of constitutional
disputes. The only strand that amounts to anything addresses the
question whether the Court should obey requirements of the
Constitution as those requirements are best understood by the
Justices. This strand turns out to amount to quite a bit. Although
the literature often refers to it as the "prudential" strand,9 this
label is deeply misleading. In fact, this version of the political
question doctrine can serve to support as well as inhibit judicial
intervention in political disputes.
For example, some
commentators have criticized the Court's controversial decision in
Bush u. Gore 10 on the ground that the Court should have invoked
the political question doctrine. l l
These commentators have
assumed that invocation of the doctrine would have led to judicial
abstention. But as Richard Posner has demonstrated, the best
defense of Bush 12 is that the Court did invoke the doctrine (albeit
8. My views are therefore similar to those of Robert Nagel, who wrote over
a decade ago that:
Like many dangerous things, [the political question doctrine) has been
given a safe appearance and name. But what looks like a slight crack is
a fault line. This doctrine, so frequently criticized and discounted,
nevertheless, has a tenacious hold on our jurisprudence. After two
hundred years of growth and consolidation, the nation's judicial system
is an imposing edifice built over a break that looks small but does not go
away.
Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the
Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 643, 643 (1989).
9. This strand was more or less originated by Alexander Bickel, who
treated it as an aspect of judicial prudence. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS
11-198 (1962). Modern commentators have generally adhered to this view.
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question,» 79
Nw. U. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1984) (associating Bickel's views with the
"prudential" branch of the doctrine).
10. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
11. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the
Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 237, 295-300 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI.
L. REV. 637 (2001); Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub and Its Disguises: Freeing
Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARv. L. REV. 170, 276-87 (2001).
12. I use these words advisedly. I don't mean to suggest that it is a
particularly good defense. For my analysis of the problems with both the
opinion and the result, see Louis Michael Seidman, What's So Bad about Bush
v. Gore? An Essay on Our Unsettled Election, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 953 (2001).
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secretly) and that that invocation led to judicial intervention. 13
In Part Two, I argue that this version of the doctrine is much
more important to the Supreme Court's daily work than is
commonly supposed. Indeed, it is ubiquitous and irrepressible. If
this claim is correct, one might wonder why so many observers of
the Court have failed to notice the doctrine's importance. My
answer is that the real political question doctrine cannot speak its
own name. Candid recognition of the doctrine's existence-the
doctrinalization of the political question doctrine-turns it into
something else. Thus, the doctrine is both ubiquitous and hidden.
Finally, in Part Three, I briefly explore some of the
implications of these observations. I conclude that the secret life
of the political question doctrine challenges not only Chief Justice
Marshall's argument in Marbury, but also the arguments of many
of Marshall's modern critics.
1.

THREE VERSIONS OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE

There is not a single political question doctrine, but three
separate doctrines, and the failure to distinguish among the three
has produced much confusion. Chief Justice Marshall articulated
the first version when he wrote that in cases where "the executive
possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more
perfectly clear than that [his] acts are only politically
examinable."14 I call this the "faux" political question doctrine
because, as many others have observed, the doctrine does no work
not already done by substantive provisions of constitutional law.
Some of the most perceptive students of the political question
doctrine-most prominently Louis Henkin-have thought that this
was all, or virtually all, that the doctrine amounted to. 15 However,
many other commentators have focused on a second version of the
doctrine, which might be labeled the "interpretive authority"
theory. 16 On this view, the Constitution vests in the political
branches final interpretive authority as to the meaning of some
constitutional provisions. Unlike the "faux" doctrine, this version
does not, in principle, consist of an empty set. Nonetheless, I
argue below that in practice the interpretive authority approach
almost always collapses into either the first category or the third,
which I have labeled the "secret" political question doctrine.
13. See RICHARD POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, THE 2000 ELECTION,
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS 162 (2001).
14. Marbury, 5 U.s. (1 Cranch) at 166.
15. See Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE
L.J. 597,622-23 (1976).
16. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 11, at 239. Although he used different
terminology, this was, in essence, the view held by Herbert Wechsler. See
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv.
L. REV. 1,7-8 (1959).
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The third approach-the secret political question doctrinetakes seriously the fact that no normative principle can establish
its own legitimacy. Hence, even if the answer to a constitutional
question is clear, courts must always decide whether they should
abide by that answer. Application of this sort of political question
doctrine cannot be determined by legal analysis because it
concerns an antecedent question about the bindingness of legal
analysis. It follows that courts cannot acknowledge in a legal
opinion that they are applying the doctrine, because any such
acknowledgment would require legal analysis.

A. Faux Political Questions
In his initial formulation of the political question doctrine,
Chief Justice Marshall seemed to have believed that application of
doctrine was something different from a decision on the merits.
Thus, before reaching the merits, he asked whether "the act of
delivering or withholding a commission [is] a mere political act,
belonging to the executive department alone, for the performance
of which, entire confidence is placed by our constitution in the
supreme executive; and for any misconduct respecting which, the
injured individual has no remedy."17
Although ultimately
concluding that the particular act before him did not fall into this
category, he left no doubt that some other unspecified acts did. IS
But which acts? Marshall's silence on this point created a
puzzle that has lasted two centuries. If, indeed, the Constitution
places "entire confidence" in the executive with regard to some
acts, then, it would seem, the Constitution is not violated when the
President performs those acts. But if there is no constitutional
violation, then the President will win the case on the merits and
there will be no need to resort to preliminary, political question
analysis. Conversely, if the President has violated the relevant
constitutional provisions, then the Constitution has not placed
"entire confidence" in him, and the political question doctrine
therefore fails to shield his conduct from judicial review. In either
event, political question analysis is superfluous; precisely the
same results follow from straightforward constitutional
interpretation. 19

17. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 164.
18. After the sentence quoted in text, Marshall added: "That there may be
such cases is not to be questioned." [d.
19. The tendency to conflate the political question doctrine with the merits
is not limited to the doctrine's defenders. For example, in his book-length
attack on application of the political question doctrine to foreign affairs,
Thomas F. Franck shifts seamlessly between criticism of judicial abstention
and criticism of a substantive constitutional interpretation that leaves the
President unconstrained. THOMAS F. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL
ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAw APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS 18 (1992).
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Two of the Court's most recent decisions concerning the
political question doctrine usefully illustrate this familiar point.
In Walter Nixon v. United States, a former district judge
challenged his removal from office following his impeachment by
the House of Representatives and conviction by the Senate. 20 His
claim on the merits was that he had not been "tried" within the
meaning of the Constitution's impeachment clause because the
actual trial procedures occurred before a Senate committee rather
than the full body. Purporting to avoid the merits of this claim,
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion argued that the case
posed a nonjusticiable political question. The Chief Justice relied
upon two indicia of political questions earlier identified in Baker v.
Carr 21-viz., that there was "a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department" and that there was "a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it.,,22
How does one determine whether these indicia are satisfied?
Here is where the shuffle begins. In order to determine whether
there is a textually demonstrable commitment and judicially
manageable standards, the Court tells us, we must decide what
the word "try" means as it is used in the impeachment clause.
According to the Court
The word "try," both in 1787 and later, has considerably broader
meanings than those to which petitioner would limit it .... [W]e
cannot say that the Framers used the word "try" as an implied
limitation on the method by which the Senate might proceed in
trying impeachments ....
We agree with Nixon that courts possess power to review either
legislative or executive action that transgresses identifiable textual
limits. . . .
But we conclude... that the word "try" in the
Impeachment Trial Clause does not provide an identifiable textual
23
limit on the authority which is committed to the Senate.

It should be obvious that this holding amounts to a
determination that Nixon's constitutional rights were not violated.
Like many constitutional provisions, the impeachment clause
affords Congress discretion-in this case, discretion in its choice of
methods by which an impeached official is "tried." Because the
Senate's conduct fell within this zone of discretion, Nixon had no
Franck assails "[tlhe radical notion ... that the political discretion of the
president in foreign affairs is neither circumscribed by the Constitution nor
reviewable by the courts." [d. He fails to see that once it is established that
the President's political discretion is not constitutionally circumscribed, it
hardly matters whether or not it is reviewable by the courts.
20. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
21. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
22. Nixon, 506 U.s. at 228; Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
23. Nixon, 506 U.s. at 230,237-38.
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ground for complaint. Had the Senate's conduct fallen outside the
zone of discretion, it would have "transgress [ed] identifiable
textual limits.,,24 This transgression, in turn, would have meant
that there were ''judicially. discoverable and manageable
standards"-viz., the textual limits. Moreover, the textual limits
themselves would have demonstrated that there was no textual
commitment permitting the Senate to use this method of trying
impeachments. Thus, Nixon's case posed a political question only
because he lost. If he had had a valid claim on the merits, the
political question doctrine would not have shielded it from judicial
vindication.
The point is driven home by comparing Nixon to Davis v.
Bandemer, where Justice White, writing for the plurality, and
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, argued over
application of the doctrine to the problem of partisan
gerrymandering. 25 In the end, one cannot help but wonder what
all the shouting was about.
Justice O'Connor's stated position was that the political
question doctrine should shield issues of partisan gerrymandering
from judicial review. However, even a superficial reading of her
opinion makes clear that she believed this only because she also
believed that the practice in question survived judicial review. On
her view, "in order to [decide whether the case posed a political
question], it is necessary to interpret the Equal Protection
Clause."26 As she understood the Equal Protection Clause, "no
group right to an equal share of political power was ever intended
by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment."27 But this is the
very sort of judgment on the merits that the political question
doctrine is supposed to avoid.
In contrast, Justice White's stated position was that the
political question doctrine was inapplicable. 26 It was therefore
necessary for him to reach the merits. Once he did so, he
concluded that the equal protection clause permitted political
gerrymandering except in a very narrowly defined class of cases.29
Just as O'Connor's position might be rephrased as a judgment on
the merits, so too White's position might be expressed in political
question language. So long as state legislatures stayed within the
bounds of the rules White prescribed for them, their decisions were

24. Id. at 238.
25. 478 U.s. 109 (1986).
26. Id. at 148 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
27. [d. at 147.
28. [d. at 122-23.
29. Justice White thought that political gerrymandering was
unconstitutional only when there was "evidence of continued frustration of the
will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a
fair chance to influence the political process." [d. at 133.
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within their "constitutional or legal discretion" and therefore "only
politically examinable."
Of course, in this sense every
nonmeritorious constitutional case poses a political question. In
every constitutional case, the· Court ,must decide whether a
political branch has acted within the bounds of the discretion
granted to it, and it is always true that if it has, its decision is not
judicially examinable. But a doctrine that describes everything
describes nothing, so this recharacterization of Justice White's
opinion only reenforces the emptiness of political question analysis
and serves to justify Justice White's choice to express his views in
terms of the merits.
Why, then, does Justice O'Connor use the arcane and indirect
vocabulary of political questions to reach a similar set of
conclusions? Perhaps the answer lies in another two-century-old.
hangover from Marbury-the annoying habit of cloaking the
exercise of judicial power in the language of self-abnegation.
Neurotic tics that survive this long are notoriously difficult to·
discard, especially when they reenforce useful self-delusions, as
this one surely does. If this is, indeed, the source of the modern
political question doctrine, then we hardly need worry much about
it. As most of us know, some neuroses are relatively benign and
not worth the effort to overcome. So long as no one is actually
fooled into taking this version of the political question doctrine
seriously, we can easily afford to indulge the Court's occasional
relapses.

B. The Interpretive Authority Theory
In a well-known article published in 1976, Louis Henkin
compared the faux doctrine with what he called "a meaningful
political question doctrine."30 Such a doctrine, in his view, "would
have it that ... some constitutional requirements are entrusted
exclusively and finally to the political branches of government for
'self-monitoring.",31 Unlike the faux doctrine, the version that
Henkin described is, at least on first examination, neither benign
nor logically deficient. The faux doctrine avoids the merits only by
deciding them. In contrast, a "meaningful" doctrine would vest
final interpretive authority in a branch of government other than
the judiciary. For a court that followed this doctrine, there might
be an authentic gap between its political question judgment and
its judgment on the merits. Such a court might conclude that the
Constitution entitled the plaintiff to relief, but nonetheless stay its
hand on the ground that the political branches should have the
final "say" when there was disagreement about the meaning of the

30. Henkin, supra note 15, at 599.
31. [d.
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Constitution. 32
Henkin did not deny that such a doctrine might exist in
principle. However, after a careful study of all the Court's then
extant political question jurisprudence, he was doubtful that it did
exist in fact and more doubtful still that it should exist.
One must admire Henkin's resourcefulness and analytic
acuity in reinterpreting and dismantling the foundations upon
which the political question doctrine supposedly rested. Within
only a few years of the article's publication, however, many
scholars had concluded that he had managed to overlook most of
what constitutional law was about. I speculate below on some
explanations rooted in the intellectual history of legal liberalism
for this changed perspective. Here, I want to suggest a simpler,
terminological explanation. Henkin focused his attention on cases
where the Court used the phrase "political question." Had he
freed himself from this verbal formalism, he might have noticed
that the Court regularly seemed to recognize the final interpretive
authority of the other branches without quite saying so.
Consider, for example, Katzenbach v. McClung, a case that
was still recent enough to be salient at the time when Henkin
wrote. 33 In the course of upholding application of the public
accommodations sections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act34 to a local
restaurant, against the argument that Congress had exceeded its
commerce clause powers, the Court said the following:
Congress has determined for itself that refusals of services to
Negroes have imposed burdens both upon the interstate flow of food
and upon the movement of products generally. Of course, the mere
fact that Congress has said when particular activity shall be deemed
to affect commerce does not preclude further examination by this
Court. But where we find that the legislators, in light of the facts
and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a
chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce,
35
our investigation is at an end.

Although the Court nowhere used the phrase "political
question," it is hard to make sense of this test without resort to the
interpretative authority version of the doctrine. To see why this is
so, imagine that Congress had made a mistake - albeit a "rational"
mistake - in believing that the antidiscrimination provisions of the
Act were necessary to protect commerce. As a substantive matter,
the Constitution grants Congress power to protect commerce, not
to engage in activity that someone might think protects commerce,
but actually does not do so. Thus, as a substantive matter, a
32. At least as I understand it, this was Herbert Wechsler's position. See
Wechsler, supra note 16, at 9.
33. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
35. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-04.
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"rational basis" test seems incoherent. The Court's test makes
sense only if one supposes that when there is disagreement about
the substance-about what is or is not necessary to protect
commerce-Congress has final interpretive authority so long as its
judgment is "rational."
Writing a few years after Henkin dismissed the political
question doctrine, John Hart Ely and Jesse Choper produced two
important syntheses of post-New Deal constitutionalism that
emphasized the ubiquity of the McClung-like political questions. 36
Ely offered a political theory of democracy and discrimination that
could be read as vesting interpretative authority over the
Constitution's ambiguous provisions in the political branches
except in circumstances where a defect in the political process
prevented a democratic outcome. 37 Choper added to Ely's political
insights a richly supported empirical analysis of the built-in
political protections for federalism and separation of powers that
made judicial intervention superfluous. Taken together, Choper
and Ely suggested that vast expanses of ordinary constitutional
jurisprudence - from "rational basis" review for many equal
protection and due process claims,3s to most cases involving the
reach of congressional power,39 to famous constitutional chestnuts
like Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer40 and United States v.
Nixon 41-could best be understood by viewing them through the
lens of political question. These ideas were, in turn, formalized
and made more explicit in a seminal article by Lawrence Sager
introducing the concept of "underenforcement" and focusing
explicitly on the problem of institutional competence as central to
the allocation of interpretive authority!2
Ely, Choper, and Sager wrote mostly to defend Supreme
Court jurisprudence. More recently, however, legal academics
critical of the Rehnquist Court have converted the interpretive
authority argument from a shield into a sword. AB a much more
conservative Court has moved to reinvigorate its commerce clause
review and reduce the scope of Congress' powers under section five
of the fourteenth amendment, scholars such as Rachel Barkow,43
36. See JORN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); JESSE H.
CROPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980).
37. I use this cumbersome circumlocution advisedly. As I explain below,
Ely himself would probably reject this characterization of his work.
38. See ELY, supra note 36, at 14-21, 30-33.
39. See CROPER, supra note 36, at 192-95, 245-46, 295, 330-34.
40. See id. at 316-26 (discussing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.s. 579 (1952)).
41. See id. at 336-42 (discussing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974)).
42. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
43. See Barkow, supra note 11.
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Vicki Jackson," Robert Post and Riva Segal,45 Mark Tushnet,46 and
Larry Kramer47 have faulted the Justices for ignoring the
coordinate interpretive authority of Congress.
It is easy to historicize this waxing and waning of the
interpretive authority theory so as to explain these shifts as
ideological interventions. When Henkin wrote, liberal and leftist
academics were still enjoying the afterglow of the Warren Court
revolution. For scholars working in this period, it was simply
assumed that an "activist" court would promote social progress.
Hence, the tendency to dismiss the political question doctrine. 48
Four years later, when Ely and Choper published their books, the
change in the political valence of judicial review was too obvious to
ignore. Their work can be understood as attempts to shore up the
prior accomplishments of the Warren Court, while distinguishing
this "good" activism from the "bad" Lochner-like activism that had
loomed so large in the past and that was just beginning to
threaten the future. By the turn of the century, any lingering
hopes for a revival of the Warren Court were long-since dead, and
there were, in any event, growing doubts about whether the
Warren Court had accomplished much oflasting value. Moreover,
the threat of "bad" activism that might dismantle the remnants of
the welfare state was much more real. The modern revival of a
more generalized defense of the interpretive authority position is
therefore hardly surprising.
Suppose, though, that instead of his torici zing the interpretive
authority position, we attempt to take it seriously on its own
terms. Does the position make sense? My own view (offered as
one who, uniquely, stands outside of history, of course) is that
Henkin was probably right all along, albeit for reasons somewhat
different from those that he offered. The difficulty is that the
"interpretive authority" position tends to slide into either the
"faux" position on one side or the "secret" position on the other. I
44. See Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative
Constitutionalism: Opening Up the Conversation on "Proportionality,» Rights
and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 634-38 (1999).
45. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Segal, Legislative Constitutionalism and
Section Five Power: Policentric Intrerpretation of the Family and Medical
Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003).
46. See MARK V. TuSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS 26-30 (1999).
47. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4,129-30, 145 (2001).
48. See, e.g., Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A
Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 596 (1966) (arguing that the political
question doctrine, "while perhaps not unimportant, is quite limited in its scope
of actual and potential relevance" and "has not been permitted to gain a
permanent foothold at the core of the Court's constitutional responsibility for
the protection of individual rights and for the determination of conflicts of
competence.")
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do not want to overstate this point. At least in theory, it is
possible to formulate a version of the interpretive authority theory
that is independent of the other two. In practice, however, the
tendency toward slippage is very strong and not often resisted.
We can see the difficulty by reexamining the Ely and Choper
arguments. Consider, first, Ely's views. I have expressed those
views in the language of interpretive authority, but I doubt that
he, himself, would have used this language. Instead of a theory for
how authority to interpret the Constitution should be allocated,
Ely offered his own substantive interpretation.
Ely argued that the great, sweeping, and ambiguous clauses
of the Constitution should be read against the backdrop of an
overall commitment to democratic political processes. 49 It followed
from this reading that, as a substantive matter, the Constitution
has usually not been violated in the absence of a process defect.
Put differently, even if the courts have final authority concerning
constitutional interpretation, Ely argued that the courts should
interpret the Constitution as granting substantive discretion to
the political branches in the absence of a process defect. This
position is subtly different from the interpretive authority
position, which grants political institutions final authority to
interpret the Constitution, even if they interpret it incorrectly.
If my reading of Ely's position is correct, then the political
question problem is relevant to his theory only in its "faux" form.
True, the theory leaves broad swaths of political action
unamenable to judicial review, but this is so only because, as a
substantive matter, these political actions do not violate the
Constitution as properly understood (i.e., as concerned primarily
with process defects).
Of course, the fact that Ely's views do not rest upon an
interpretive authority analysis does not prove that such an
analysis is impossible. However, it turns out to be quite difficult
to articulate any version of the interpretive authority theory that
does not end up looking a lot like Ely's position.
In order to avoid slipping into an Ely-like substantive
interpretation of the Constitution, interpretive theorists must be
agnostic about what the Constitution actually requires. Their
point is that-whatever the Constitution "actually" requires-the
political branches should sometimes have final authority to "say"
what it requires. But is there any practical difference between the
Constitution's meaning, and the meaning given to it by an
authoritative interpreter? Interpretive theorists risk falling into
what Daryl Levinson has aptly called "rights essentialism."50

49. See ELY, supra note 36, at 11-31.
50. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999).
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Rights essentialists ask us to envision rights that exists in an
abstract, Platonic sphere that is wholly disconnected from any
actual remedy that might make a difference in the real world. AB I
understand Ely's position, he is not a rights essentialist because
the substantive rights he defines, although limited, are judicially
enforceable. On the other hand, interpretive authority theorists
tend toward rights essentialism because under their theory, rights
are taken to exist even though they make no difference in the
outcome of real law suits.
Recall that the political question doctrine does work only
when, but for the doctrine, the losing party in a law suit would
have been victorious. Thus, a judge relying on the political
question doctrine must start by asserting that a right has been
violated. But it is precisely in the cases where the political
question doctrine makes a difference that the judge must also
deprive the right of efficacy. Put differently, giving the political
question doctrine work to do always means frustrating the work
that rights would otherwise do. And if rights do no work, one
might fairly ask, what is their point?51
Of course, the fact that the rights are not judicially
enforceable does not mean that they are not enforceable at all.
Judicially unenforceable rights can have real world consequences
if enforced by the political branches. Indeed, scholars who have
defended broad interpretive authority for Congress and the
President rely on just this point. 52 Their claim is that Congress
and the President will provide better protection for these rights
than courts would. 53
Unfortunately, however, this assertion, even if true, does not
overcome the rights essentialism objection. The political question
doctrine is a judicial creation, and we must therefore evaluate its
coherence from the perspective of the judges who created it. The
doctrine does work only when, from the perspective of these judges,
rights go unenforced. Hence, a judge who fails to reach the merits
because of the political question doctrine must believe that there
are rights "out there" that retain their status despite the absence
of any real world consequences attached to those rights. 54 Many
51. See Wayne McCormack, The Political Question DoctrineJurisprudentially, 70 DET. MERCY L. REV. 793,808 (1993) (arguing that "lilt is
the lack of effect on institutionally recognized relationships that makes the
political question provision nonlaw, and it is in that sense that ... the courts
hold a provision to be nonlaw when they say that it gives rise to a political
question. ")
52. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 46, at 170-77.
53. I discuss the interpretive authority position from the perspective of
these scholars below.
54. Perhaps real world consequences do attach to judicial declarations of
rights, even when judges do not enforce them, because the political branches
will be influenced by the "advise" provided by judges. My colleague Neal
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people will find this view deeply implausible. 55 They will ask what,
precisely, is the difference between a world where rights go
unenforced and world where there are no rights. If one thinks
that there is no difference, then one will also tend to think that
there is no difference between a loss suffered because of the
political question doctrine and a loss suffered on the merits. The
interpretive authority theory thus collapses back into faux
political question fallacy.
In order to avoid (or at least mitigate) this problem, most
interpretive authority theorists are prepared to recognize
judicially enforceable boundaries that limit the interpretive
authority of the political branches. Precisely because granting
unbounded interpretive authority to Congress would, effectively,
eliminate rights that amounted to anything, these theorists want
to reduce the sphere within which interpretive authority can be
exercised.
These boundaries might be either textual or catagorical.
Katzenbach v. McClung illustrates the use of textual boundaries.
Recall that in McClung, the Court was prepared to grant Congress
interpretive authority over the phrase "[t]o regulate Commerce ...
among the several States,"56 but only so long as its application of
the clause was "rational." Moreover, the Court made clear that it
had final authority to determine what counted as "rational."
Textual boundaries do not render the interpretive authority
position altogether meaningless, but they do render it much less
significant. Consider again the Nixon case. We have seen that the
Court's actual holding that the impeachment clause granted
Congress discretion to choose the method by which Judge Nixon
was "tried"-collapses the distinction between application of the
political question doctrine and the merits.
How would the interpretive authority version of the doctrine
Katyal has explored this possibility in great depth and with great
sophistication. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advisegivers, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1709 (1998). Still, I am doubtful that political question judgments often
influence political actors to enforce judicially unenforced rights. First, courts
that fail to reach the merits because of the political question doctrine rarely
give advise. The more usual practice is simply to hold that the case is
nonjusticiable without indicating what the court would do if it were able to
reach the merits. Second, a court that holds that another branch has final
interpretive authority over the matter is saying, in effect, that our system
prefers a judgment of that other branch to a judicial judgment. This sort of
institutional modesty is not well calculated to cause members of a political
branch to doubt their own initial judgment about the matter.
55. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall himself thought it was deeply
implausible. He wrote that "The government of the United States has been
emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly
cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the
violation ofa vested legal right." Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163.
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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differ from this holding? A court following the interpretive
authority theory would say that the impeachment clause grants to
Congress final authority to interpret the word "try" even if its
interpretation differs from the Court's reading of the same word.
However, the scope of this permissible interpretation is not
unbounded. Following McClung, we might say, for example, that
the interpretation must be "rational" and that the Court will have
the final "say" as to whether the interpretation adopted by
Congress is rational or not.
Presumably, a "rational"
interpretation is one that the word will fairly bear. But if the
word "try" is open-textured enough to "rationally" include what
Congress did, it would seem to follow that Congress has, once
again, not exceeded the textual limits of the impeachment clause.
The framers' choice of an open textured word rationally subject to
different interpretations in effect granted substantive discretion to
the political branches to adopt a variety of different procedures so
long as the procedures were within the open texture. But if this is
true, the interpretive authority theory, like the faux theory, yet
again collapses back into the merits. 57
The categorical approach avoids this difficulty by ceding to
the political branches substantive categories of interpretive
authority.58 For example, it is widely supposed that Congress
alone has the authority to decide what counts as the "Republican
form of Government"59 guaranteed by Article IV. 60 There is
substantial support for the position that questions relating to

57. The point holds true even if a word is so open-textured that, as a
practical matter, the political branches have complete discretion.
For
example, Professor Pushaw argues that with regard to certain powers (he lists
the veto, impeachment, appointments, and military and foreign policy
decisions), the people have "entrusted their federal government
representatives with complete latitude" and therefore "by definition the
exercise of such discretion cannot violate the Constitution." Robert J. Pushaw,
Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the
Federalist "Rebuttable Presumption Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1196-97
(2002). Pushaw argues that these areas are appropriate for invocation of the
political question doctrine. [d. It should be clear, however, that if we start
from Pushaw's premise that the Constitution has not been (indeed cannot be)
violated with respect to these powers, the political question doctrine is, once
again, doing no work. One might, of course, quarrel with that premise. But
we should understand the nature of the quarrel. It is an argument about
substantive constitutional interpretation, not about application of the political
question doctrine.
58. See, e.g., id. (arguing in favor of a "Hamiltonian" approach that creates
a presumption that courts have final interpretive authority, but provides that
the presumption can be rebutted with respect to some particular
constitutional provisions).
59. See, e.g., Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937); Taylor
v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
60. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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foreign affairs are politica1. 61 For a period, it was thought that
enforcement of the Tenth Amendment's protection of state
sovereignty was the sole responsibility ofthe political branches. 62
The categorical approach holds that courts have no business
deciding whether the political branches act "rationally" when they
interpret relevant constitutional language within these categories
of cases. Instead, the categories are wholly within the exclusive
jurisdiction of Congress and the President. Thus, on a categorical
approach, the Court might have held that even if Congress had
irrationally interpreted the word "try," the Court should
nonetheless stay its hand because the entire subject of
impeachment is within Congress' interpretive domain.
There is not an inherent logical fallacy with this approach,
but it nonetheless poses two significant difficulties. First, if
interpretive authority is not to be completely unbounded, the
Court still must have final authority to decide whether the
political branches are acting within an appropriate category.63
This decision, in turn, involves a question of constitutional
interpretation64-a fact that reintroduces textual analysis through
the back door.6s Suppose, for example, that the stated ground for
impeaching a federal judge was that he was an African American.
Does this sort of "impeachment" fall within the boundaries of an
immune category? If the definition of the category is, itself, a
matter of constitutional interpretation, then one would suppose
that the Court must bring to bear constitutional provisions
relating to race discrimination when defining the category. And
61. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,211 (1962); Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 269, 302 (1918).
62. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
But cf New York v. United States, 505 U.s. 144 (1992); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
63. Thus, as Herbert Wechsler has written:
[Tlhe only proper judgment that may lead to an abstention from decision
is that the Constitution has committed the determination of the issue to
another agency of government than the courts. Difficult as it may be to
make the judgment wisely, whatever factors may be rightly weighed in
situations where the answer is not clear, what is involved is in itself an
act of constitutional interpretation, to be made and judged by standards
that should govern the interpretive process generally.
Wechsler, supra note 16, at 9.
64. As the Court said in Baker:
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the
Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of
that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a
delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility
ofthis Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
369 U.S. at 211.
65. Martin Redish has made a similar point. See Redish, supra note 9, at
1041.
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once it does that, it will be obvious to the Court that this sort of
"impeachment" is not within the constitutionally delineated
boundaries.
My hypothetical example provides a relatively easy case, but
the Court has actually decided a harder one. In Powell v.
McCormack,66 the House of Representatives, purporting to utilize
its Article II power to "be the judge of the ... Qualifications of its
own Members,,,s7 refused to permit Congressman Adam Clayton
Powell to take his seat. If one took the categorical approach to
interpretive authority seriously, one might suppose that this
would be the end of the matter. Yet despite explicit language in
Article II that seems to vest interpretive authority in Congress,
the Court nonetheless held that it could adjudicate Powell's claim.
On the Court's view, in order to determine whether Congress was
exercising its exclusive authority, the Court had to interpret the
word "Qualifications." This word, the Court said, included only
the age, citizenship, and residence requirements of Article 1.68
Since Powell obviously satisfied these requirements, it followed
that Congress must have been doing something other than judging
his "Qualifications" when it refused to seat him. Therefore,
Congress was acting outside the category of cases over which it
had interpretive authority, and Powell's claim was justiciable.69
I do not mean to suggest that as a matter of pure logic, Powell
had to be decided in the way that it was. Still, it is easy to see why
the Court wanted to reach the merits of his claim. To make the
point more explicit, suppose that Congress had made a clearly
irrational or disingenuous judgment about Powell's qualifications,
concluding, for example, that a few weekends spent in Bimini
meant that he was not a "resident" of New York. A Court could
hold that this finding was nonjusticiable simply because Congress
claimed that it was acting within the category of "qualifications."
However, it will inevitably seem to the Court that, whatever it
claimed, Congress was not in fact adjudicating the question vested
in it by the Constitution. Confronted with this problem, the Court
will be under pressure to find that Congress has not acted within
the scope of its interpretive authority and, so, to decide the merits.
The second problem arises when one attempts to avoid this
difficulty by adopting non textual , functional grounds for
delineating spheres of interpretive authority. This is the project of
Choper's book. For Choper, the political branches should be ceded
interpretive authority over federalism and separation of powers
claims, while the courts should retain interpretive authority over

66. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
67. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 5, cl. 1.
68. Powell, 395 U.S. at 522.
69. [d. at 548-49.

HeinOnline -- 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 457 2003-2004

458

The John Marshall Law Review

[37:441

civil liberties claims. 70
Choper does not rely upon textual
provisions, like the "Qualifications" Clause of Article I to reach
this conclusion.
Instead, he adopts a functional approach.
Following Herbert Wechsler,71 he argues that there are "built-in"
political guarantees for federalism and separation of powers
principles that make judicial intervention unnecessary.
In
contrast, the political branches cannot be trusted to protect
minority rights, so judicial intervention is necessary within this
sphere. 72
Whereas Ely's position folds interpretive authority back into
"faux" political questions, Choper's tends toward conflation of the
interpretive authority and "secret" versions of the doctrine. The
problem for Choper is to defend the criteria for determining
whether the political and judicial branches achieve the "right"
level of protection for the various principles at stake. For the most
part, Choper's book simply avoids this problem. To be sure, he
produces a rich variety of empirical data showing the varying
extent to which the political branches protect federalism,
separation of powers, and individual rights values. 73 But empirical
data famously fail to answer normative questions.
Choper
therefore simply assumes, without much discussion, that the
reader will agree with him that the political protections for
federalism and separation of powers somehow yield the "right"
balance, whereas those for civil liberties do not. 74

70. See CHOPER, supra note 36, at 65,67-68, 175,263.
71. See Herbert Wechsler, Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
72. See CHOPER, supra note 36, at 65,68-70,79-80,202-03,275,314.
73. See id. at 68, 185-88, 238-39, 282-95.
74. For example, Choper asserts that "the experience of history strongly
suggests that vesting the majority with the ultimate power of judgment,
although far from being calamitous, would not sufficiently protect minority
rights." Id. at 65. In support of this proposition, Choper cites our experience
with slavery, public assistance to church-related schools, internal security,
and the socioeconomic rights of racial minorities. [d. at 68. We can put to one
side the issue of slavery, where, to say the least, there is no evidence that the
courts performed any better than majoritarian institutions. Choper's other
examples have force only if one agrees with him on the merits of these
disputes. But not everyone does agree. Unfortunately, Choper's book provides
no argument supporting his side of the dispute.
Similarly, Choper argues that judicial review of the Constitution's
federalism provisions is unnecessary because "the proliferation of national
programs has neither led to a centralized autocracy nor resulted in the total
concentration of federal power to the exclusion of the individual states." [d. at
186. Here, Choper's rhetoric unfairly prejudices the argument by excluding
middle cases. To be sure, if one emphasizes the words "autocracy" and "total"
his conclusion is uncontroversial. But one might similarly say that the
absence of judicial review of civil liberties claims would not lead to death
camps and the gulag. In the civil liberties context, Choper understands that
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How does Choper know that this is true? Importantly, the
criteria for "rightness" cannot be grounded in the Constitution
itself. By hypothesis, the judiciary and the political branches
disagree about what the Constitution requires. For Choper to take
sides in this dispute would be for him to decide the merits-the
very thing that the political question doctrine is supposed to avoid.
If the point of Choper's exercise is to devise legal rules that
produce constitutionally mandated outcomes, he could do so
directly by simply telling us what the Constitution mandates. It
follows, I think, that Choper's criteria must be extraconstitutional.
Choper has an unarticulated and undefended political position
(which he expects the reader to share) that is best achieved by
manipulating the jurisdictional responsibilities of the various
political branches. Put differently, Choper's political question
doctrine leads a secret life.
Under the cover of doctrinal
respectability, his political question doctrine subverts the core
assumptions of constitutionalism by deciding the very political
questions it purports to avoid.
C. Secret Political Questions

Choper is not alone in wrestling with a secret political
question doctrine. The most famous chronicler of secret political
questions was Alexander Bickel. In order to understand both the
great strengths and important weaknesses of Bickel's insights,
they must be historically and politically located.
Published more than a decade before the work of Ely, Choper,
and Henkin, Bickel's best known book,75 was preoccupied with the
crisis in judicial legitimacy produced by Brown v. Board of
Education. 76 In Bickel's world, the Warren Court had not yet
achieved iconic status and the outcome of its dramatic
intervention in race relations remained very much in doubt.
"Massive resistance" was still at its height, the President was not
yet firmly committed to a civil rights agenda, and Congress was
dominated by southern segregationists.
Faced with uncertain and wavering political support, the
Supreme Court charted a cautious path. Whereas the Brown I
opinion was marked by sweeping and powerful rhetoric, Brown II77
suggested pragmatism and willingness to compromise. Between
Brown II and the publication of Bickel's book in 1962, the Court
avoiding these extreme outcomes is not good enough. He fails to understand
that even if judicial abstention from federalism claims would not lead to
autocracy or total concentration of power, but it might nonetheless produce
undesirable or unconstitutional centralization. Once again, Choper's book
provides no argument refuting this position.
75. BICKEL, supra note 9.
76. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
77. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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had remained almost entirely silent, seemingly avoiding the
conflict that its own opinion had sparked. 78 Indeed, in Nairn v.
Nairn,79 a case decided shortly after Brown, the Court went to
embarrassing lengths to avoid striking down a blatantly racist
antimiscegenation statute when doing so would have upset white
southern sensibilities. 80 To many contemporary observers, the
result in Nairn seemed completely lawless and impossible to
justify on the basis ofprinciple. 81
The Court's behavior during this period produced an
intellectual crisis among the liberal legal intelligentsia, still
struggling with the legacy of Lochner and its repudiation. In the
immediate wake of Brown, Judge Learned Hand had reopened the
old question about whether any form of judicial review was
legitimate. 82 In a famous response, Herbert Wechsler defended
judicial review, but only so long as it was "principled."83 At the
conclusion of his essay, he raised serious doubts about whether
Brown could be defended on a principled basis. 84
As a young legal academic, Bickel was doubtless caught up in
the intellectual doubts raised by Hand and Wechsler. But he had
also clerked for Justice Frankfurter while Brown was being
considered and believed that the case had been decided correctly.85
78. After issuing a series of per curiam opinions, extending Brown to state
mandated segregation in fields other than education, see Gayle v. Browder,
352 U.S. 903 (1956); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Mayor of
Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), the Court intervened only once,
responding to outright and very public defiance by Governor Orval Faubus of
Arkansas. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
79. 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (vacating and remanding judgment below), appeal
dismissed 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
80. In a memorandum to his fellow justices concerning Naim, Justice
Frankfurter, for whom Bickel clerked, made clear his view that the "moral
considerations" far outweighed the "technical considerations" in disposing of
the case. The "moral" considerations
are, of course, those raised by the bearing of adjudicating this question
to the Court's responsibility in not thwarting or seriously handicapping
the enforcement of its decision in the segregation cases. . .. For I find it
difficult to believe that there is a single member of this Court who does
not think that to throw a decision of this Court other than validating
this legislation into the vortex of the present disquietude would not
seriously, I believe very seriously embarrass the carrying out of the
Court's decree oflast May.
The memorandum is reproduced in Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and
Desegregation: Decision Making in the Supreme Court 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J.
1, 96-97 (1979).
81. See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 16, at 34.
82. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 15-18 (1958).
83. See Wechsler, supra note 16, at 15.
84. Id. at 33-34.
85. For an account of Bickel's role in the Brown deliberations, see MARK V.
TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARsHALL AND THE
SUPREME COURT 1936-1961, at 203 (1994).
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The project of Bickel's book, then, was to take into account the
arguments that Hand and Wechsler had made, while also
defending the Court's Brown and post-Brown stance.
Accomplishing this task required a subtle and complex
dialectical argument. On the one hand, judicial review in general
and Brown in particular was defensible on the ground that the
Court could appropriately protect enduring principles against
temporary majoritarian pressure. 86 On the other hand, no society
could survive on an exclusive diet of rigid adherence to
unwavering principle. 87 It followed that the Court could maintain
its principled stance only by unprincipled restrictions on the
occasions for declarations of principle. Relying on the much older
progressive tradition associated with Brandeis, Thayer, and his
own mentor, Frankfurter, Bickel saw the Court's willingness to
stay its hand as an important precondition to its legitimacy when
it chose to act. It was crucial for the Court to act in principled
fashion as, pace Wechsler, it surely had acted in Brown. But in
the real world, the Court could only maintain this principled
stance if it paid some attention to politics when it decided whether
to decide. 88 Hence, Brown I, Brown II and Nairn had all been
rightly decided. 89
Bickel's argument had two important corollaries with regard
to the political question doctrine. First, it meant that his version
of the doctrine, unlike the versions considered so far, had real bite.
For Bickel, application of the doctrine involved far more than the
mere recognition that the political branches had acted within the
discretion the Constitution granted to them. Bickel's version
simply resists being domesticated in this fashion. There is ...
something different about it, in kind not in degree; something
greatly more flexible, something of prudence, not construction and
not principle. And it is something that cannot exist within the four
90
comers of Marbury u. Madison.

There is, then, nothing "faux" about this political question
doctrine. In the struggle between principle and expedience, the
doctrine is the mechanism by which courts give expedience its due.
The doctrine reflects a profoundly subversive judicial judgment
that constitutional adjudication has its limits. Bickel's crucial
insight, never fully articulated, is that constitutional law cannot
be self-validating. Judges must inevitably make judgments about
whether to apply constitutional law. There will therefore be some
86. See BICKEL, supra note 9, at 24-28.

87. See id. at 64.
88. See id. at 70.

89. For Bickel's awkward effort to defend both Brown l, as principled, and
Brown II, as expedient, see id. at 244-255. For his defense of Naim, see id. at
174.
90. ld. at 125-26.
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cases in which the Court simply should not obey constitutional
commands and in these cases, there will be a real gap between the
constitutional merits and the result the Court actually reaches.
Had Bickel's analysis stopped there, his work would have
been truly radical. However, he attempted to cut off the most
destabilizing aspects of his claim with a second corollary that
sharply limited the force of the first. Although muscular and
meaningful, Bickel's political question doctrine was nonetheless a
"passive virtue."91 It provided arguments for not acting; not a
reason for action. Bickel argued for this distinction on the ground
that only by not deciding some things could the Court protect the
legal purity of the things it chose to decide. Thus,
[T]he techniques and allied devices for staying the Court's hand ...
cannot themselves be principled in the sense in which we have a
right to expect adjudications on the merits to be principled. They
mark the point at which the Court gives the electoral institutions
their head and itself stays out of politics, and there is nothing
paradoxical in finding that here is where the Court is a most
political animal. 92

Nothing paradoxical? The real drama in Bickel's book
revolves around his ultimately futile effort to persuade us that this
seeming paradox can be resolved. The book's failure is perfectly
captured by Gerald Gunther's devastating taunt that Bickel
insisted on one hundred percent devotion to principle twenty
percent of the time. 93 As Gunther powerfully demonstrated, it was
difficult to see how the Court could maintain either its reputation
for or the reality of apolitical neutrality by engaging in conduct
that was concededly political. The political question doctrine could
hardly keep the Court out of politics if application of the doctrine,
itself, required political judgments.
Gunther's critique leads to the disquieting conclusion that if
the passive virtues are to serve their intended function, they can
do so only by misleading the country. Bickel must have assumed
that the Court could maintain its reputation for apolitical,
principled adjudication while still acting politically because the
country paid more attention to what the Court decided than to
what it chose not to decide. But not doing is, after all, also a kind
of doing;94 for the parties involved in Nairn, the Court's

91. [d. at 200.
92. [d. at 132.
93. See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues" - A
Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
1,3(1964).
94. Indeed, as Professor Scharpf pointed out, a political question
determination, unlike other techniques of avoidance such as ripeness,
mootness, or standing has an impact far broader than its effect on the
immediate parties. When a court uses other avoidance techniques, it holds
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disingenuous avoidance of the merits had precisely the same
impact as a decision upholding the statute. 95 If the two results
differed at all, the difference lay in how the alternative
dispositions were (or would have been) perceived. A decision
upholding the Virginia antimiscegination statute would
"legitimate" naked racism, whereas a "nondecision," somehow
getting rid of the case on unprincipled grounds, would noe6 But
this difference, if indeed it exists at all, crucially depends upon the
public's failure to understand the actual consequences of what the
Court has done or failed to do. The Court was, in effect, betting on
Brown creating banner headlines, while Naim slipped unreported
through the news sieve.
Bickel's struggle with the issue of judicial candor is painful
and contradictory. In a section of the book discussing Justice
Hugo Black's absolutist views of constitutional interpretation, he
addresses the possibility that Black might have overstated his
position in order to protect the "right" level of principle from
political erosion.
If Black is, indeed, creating "an illusion,
purposefully fostered,"97 Bickel is strongly censorious.
To introduce into judicial review the factor of attitude springing
from illusion would be gravely to depreciate and damage the
process. The process is justified only if it is as deliberate and
conscious as men can make it.... [T]he Court should not tell itself
or the world that it draws decisions from a text that is incapable of
yielding them. That obscures the actual process of decision, for the
country, and for the judges themselves, if they fall in with the
illusion. And it is a menace, to the Court and to the country .... 98

Yet the purity that Bickel sought can be maintained only
through the very dissembling that Bickel condemned. The Court
could afford to stand on principle in Brown only because it
deliberately and self-consciously obscured reality in Naim.
This contradiction, in turn, raises intriguing questions about
Bickel's own candor. Perhaps it is true that the Court can better
hide its politics when it refuses to decide than when it decides.
open the possibility that the claim might be adjudicated by different parties
suing at a different time. In contrast, a political question determination
permanently insulates an area from legal challenge. See Fritz W. Scharpf,
Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE
L.J. 517, 537 (1966).
95. Cf. Graham Hughes, Civil Disobedience and the Political Question
Doctrine, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 15 (1968) (arguing that a court decision that it
has no power to make a determination "is tantamount to a finding that there
is a legal liberty for the legislature or executive to perform the challenged
act").
96. See BICKEL, supra note 9, at 69-70. For Gunther's criticism of this
position, see Gunther, supra note 93, at 6-8.
97. BICKEL, supra note 9, at 96.
98. [d. at 96-97.
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There may nonetheless be occasions when it can hide its politics
well enough even when it decides. 99 If political necessity is
powerful enough, should the Court, on these occasions, abandon
its devotion to principle when it acts as well as when it fails to
act?IOO One thing is certain: if Bickel thought that it should, he
would never have told us so. For if, indeed, the Court's politics
must remain secret, then it would hardly do for the Court's
defenders to reveal the secret.
These observations are, of course speculative, but the
speculation is not altogether groundless. Recall that Bickel
defended Brown as an example of principled adjudication. So, of
course, did all nine Justices of the Supreme Court. Yet we now
know from examination of the Justices' (then) secret conference
notes that several of the Justices, including Bickel's employer at
the time (none other than Felix Frankfurter), voted for Brown
despite extremely serious reservations about the legal justification
for the opinion. l01 Could Bickel have shared these doubts?102 If so,
. he could hardly have publicly acknowledged as much. Honesty
about the need for dishonesty is, of course, contradictory, but in
the context in which Bickel wrote, contradiction was the least of it.
With the Supreme Court under attack by bigots and reactionaries,
with racial justice on the line, and with the political and moral
imperatives as strong as they have been at any time in the Court's
history, candor would have amounted to self-indulgent moral
cowardice. In the face of all this, could it be that Alexander Bickel
99. Moreover, as Martin Redish points out, the Court sometimes courts
political backlash by refusing to decide, rather than by deciding. See Redish,
supra note 9, at 1059. (noting that the Court may have expended political
capital because of its refusal to decide federalism issues).
100. Even if one applies the criteria traditionally associated with the
political question doctrine, action may sometimes be more defensible than
inaction. Consider, for example, the problem of embarrassment of the United
States in its relationships with other governments. As Fritz Scharpf points
out, there may be occasions when "the State Department may be much more
embarrassed by the necessity to take a stand on questions of this nature than
by the need to explain the decisions of American courts to a foreign
government." Scharpf, supra note 94, at 582.
101. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 303-04 (2004);
TuSHNET, supra note 85, at 188-210.
102. A memorandum Bickel wrote for Frankfurter's benefit, later converted
into a law review article, strongly suggests that Bickel entertained doubts as
to whether conventional legal materials supported Brown. Alexander M.
Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 61 (1955). The article ultimately defends Brown, but concludes
somewhat lamely that the equal protection clause allowed moderates and
radicals both "to go to the country with language which they could, where
necessary, defend against damaging alarms raised by the opposition, but
which at the same time was sufficiently elastic to permit reasonable future
advances." [d.
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was too principled to stand on principle?

II.

DOCTRINE AND THE POLITICAL QUESTION "DOCTRINE"

A. Normalizing Secret Political Questions

We can never know whether Bickel secretly favored the
Court's secret politics. What is certain, though, is that the secret
political question doctrine played, and continues to play, a vital
role in the Court's affairs. Nor is the doctrine merely a "passive
virtue." On a regular basis, the Court makes political judgments
about the applicability of the Constitution, both when it declines to
decide cases and when it decides them.l03
On some level, this fact should hardly surprise us. It
amounts to no more than a logical truth that a normative system
cannot establish its own normative worthiness. Admit it or not,
every Justice in every case faces a logically antecedent question
before she interprets the Constitution: should I do what the
Constitution commands?
Two things are plain: first, the
Constitution itself cannot answer this question. Second, there will
be occasions when the right answer is "no."
These propositions may seem shocking or extreme, yet they
are so conventional that we hardly notice the occasions when they
guide behavior. Indeed, for reasons I will explain below, they
serve their purpose only because we do not notice. In this sense,
the recent occasion when the country did notice is aberrational.
Many Americans believe that Bush v. Gore lO4 was resolved on the
basis of political, rather than legal imperatives. On the least
charitable view, the Court was determined to enforce its own
version of the "Republican form of government clause," as the (now
tired) joke goes. Richard Posner has advanced a much more
charitable view. He argues that the case was rightly decided, not
because the law somehow required this result but because the
Court's decision saved us from a nontrivial possibility of disabling
deadlock. 105
There are good reasons to doubt that Posner is right about the
prospects of deadlock and room for reasonable disagreement about
whether even real prospects of deadlock were sufficient reason to
justify deviation from law. Still, whatever the merits of Bush
103. In this sense, although Gunther's criticism of Bickel hit the mark,
Gunther misunderstood the implications of the criticism-at least by my
lights. Gunther was right to assert that there was no rlistinction between
political (as opposed to legal) action and inaction. See Gunther, supra note 93.
Gunther argued that the Court therefore should follow legal principles both
when it acted and when it failed to act. [d. In contrast, my argument is that
the Court cannot avoid political judgments in both situations.
104. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
105. POSNER, supra note 13, 134-45, 186, 188.
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itself, it seems indisputable that occasions will arise when the
claims of law are outweighed by other moral or political
imperatives. Legal scholars who have complained about the Bush
Court's putative failure to invoke the political question doctrine 106
have therefore missed the real heart of the dispute about the case.
If it was, indeed, wrongly decided, the Court's error lay in too
ready a resort to the political question doctrine, rather than in
failure to make use of it.
Bush created a tremendous controversy, but, as noted above,
the more conventional uses of the doctrine go largely unnoticed. I
outline here three examples of the Court's regular reliance on
political criteria to decide whether to obey the Constitution.

1.

Stare Decisis

The connection between political questions and stare decisis
may not be immediately apparent, but it is real nonetheless.
When the Court follows prior precedent in a constitutional case, it
is, in effect, saying that political judgments should overcome the
requirements of constitutional law.
To see the point, consider Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 107 perhaps the Court's most
famous decision defending stare decisis. Much to the surprise of
many legal commentators, the Casey Court declined to overrule
Roe v. Wade. In its extended and extraordinary discussion of its
reasons for this conclusion, the controlling opinion elaborated on a
set of criteria for determining whether to abide by a former
decision. The Justices emphasized factors like whether there had
been reliance on the prior decision, whether it had been overtaken
by later factual developments, and whether later doctrinal
developments
made
the earlier decision
anomalous. 108
Significantly, the Court made no effort to tie these criteria to
constitutional law.
Instead, they appear to be judge-made,
extraconstitutional norms.
Moreover, at least one of the norms was overtly political in a
way that Alexander Bickel would have understood. On the view of
the justices signing the controlling opinion, it is essential that the
Court act to preserve its own reputation for legitimacy. This
reputation is crucially dependent on the country's perception that
it 'is not vulnerable to political pressure. Hence, when the Court is
under political attack, it must stand its ground. Paradoxically, the
appearance of staunch and apolitical resistence to political
pressure is, itself, a political imperative. 109 In Casey, the Court

106. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
107. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
108. [d. at 854-55.
109. [d. at 867-68.
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held, in effect, that this political imperative was strong enough to
tolerate violation of the Constitution.
Of course, the controlling opinion did not say directly that it
was departing from constitutional norms. Indeed, a section of the
opinion introduced a new defense of the abortion right. 110
Nonetheless, there must have been some reason why the
discussion of stare decisis occupied so much space in the
controlling opinion. Reliance on stare decisis is necessary only in
cases where but for the doctrine, the Court would have followed a
different course. It follows that whenever stare decisis makes a
difference, the Court is disobeying a constitutional command as
the justices then understand that command.l11 Because stare
decisis is a doctrine about constitutional disobedience, the Court
can hardly rely upon criteria derived from the Constitution to
govern its applicability. Instead, the application vel non of stare
decisis is a political question
Some critics of stare decisis have concluded that the doctrine
is therefore illegitimate. 112 Of course, these critics are right if
criteria for legitimacy can be derived only from the Constitution
itself. But why should anyone believe this? Surely, there are at
least some occasions when the imperatives of consistency, settled
expectations, legitimacy, or simply efficiency justify not revisiting
questions that have long been settled. At least this is what
virtually every Justice who has served on the Court has believed.
So far as we know, these Justices have been able to sleep quite
well at night (thank you) despite their regular defiance of their
constitutional obligations.

2.

Constitutional Remedy

Like stare decisis, the law of constitutional remedy lies
outside the bounds of constitutionalism. In Bickel's generation,
this point became obvious when the Court turned from the

110. [d. at 852 (arguing that abortion protected because pregnant woman's
"suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more,
upon its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has
been in the course of our history and our culture").
111. For just this reason, stare decisis plays no role in the civil law tradition.
For civilians, respect for precedent is inconsistent with the primacy of the
Code and, therefore, with the rule of law. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE
CIVIL LAw TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF
WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 36 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing rejection
of stare decisis in civil law systems). See also Mitchel de s.-o.-rE. Lasser,
Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System, 104
YALE L.J. 1325, 1335-37 (1995) (discussing "official" French position that
judges are prohibited from establishing any rule capable of application in a
later case).
112. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case against Precedent, 17
HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 23 (1994).
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substantive requirement of desegregation in Brown I to the issue
of remedy in Brown II. As Bickel acknowledged, when the Court
turned to remedy, the issues became practical and political rather
than principled and constitutional.
In our own time, the controversy over the fourth amendment
exclusionary
rule
best
demonstrates
the
necessarily
nonconstitutional status of remedial doctrine. In recent years, the
Court has settled upon a deterrence-based justification for the
rule. On this theory, use of improperly obtained evidence is not,
itself, an "unreasonable search or seizure" that violates the fourth
amendment. Rather, the exclusionary rule is constitutionally
compelled in order to deter future violations. 113
The Court has regularly used this deterrence-based
framework to balance the deterrent efficacy of the rule in various
settings against its law enforcement cost, and when it has found
that the latter outweighed the former, it has declined to extend the
rule. 114 In the opinion of the Court's many critics, this balancing is
deeply unprincipled because it presupposes an undefended value
that is attached to each side of the balance. 115
What the critics have failed to notice is that this valuing
cannot possibly be accomplished within the four corners of
constitutionalism. The problem becomes apparent as soon as one
acknowledges that no sensible legal system would attempt to
reduce the level of fourth amendment violations to zero. A policy,
seriously pursued, that attempted this course would require the
subordination of all extraconstitutional values to the prevention of
fourth amendment violations. In such a world, the exclusionary
rule would be the least of it; offending officers would be executed
or jailed for life.
There must, therefore, be an optimal level of fourth
amendment violation. But what level? Plainly, we cannot look to
the Constitution itself to determine the appropriate level of
constitutional violation. It follows that judges must create fourth
amendment remedies
according to
criteria that are
nonconstitutional.
Moreover, any sensible remedy will be
constitutionally deficient in the sense that it will tolerate the
113. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (stating
that the exclusionary rule is a "judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved").
114. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.s. 897 (1984) (declining to extend
rule to situations where officer relies in good faith on facially valid warrant);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (declining to extend rule to habeas corpus
proceedings); Immigration & Nat. Servo V. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032
(1984) (declining to extend the rule to deportation proceedings).
115. See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 949-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also
Silas Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the
Scaffold: But Was the Trial Fair?, 22 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 87-88 (1984).
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continued existence of justified constitutional violations. The
decision to impose one remedy rather than another is therefore
political in the sense that it balances nonconstitutional values
against constitutional commands and allows the former to
outweigh the latter when it seems sensible to do so.

3. Doctrinal Elaboration
The prior two examples involve discrete areas of
constitutional law. However, the point of the examples can be
generalized.
As scholars such as Richard Fallon, 116 David
Strauss ,117 Henry Monaghan,118 and Akhil Amar119 have taught us,
constitutional doctrine is separate from and, in an important
sense, in tension with constitutional law. In any advanced
constitutional system, it will not be possible to apply undiluted
constitutional commands to cases as they arise. Instead, judges
over time will have to gloss the naked commands with judge-made
supplements.
Given this fact, it is not surprising that many of the Court's
modern constitutional decisions make no more than passing
reference to the document itself. Instead, the U.S. Reports are
filled with discussion of the four part Central Hudson test for
commercial speech, the various tiers of review in equal protection
cases, or the different variety of public fora available for political
demonstrations.
Without an understanding of the central role played by the
political question doctrine, the existence of this doctrinal overlay
can seem quite mysterious. Consider, for example, Dickerson v.
United States/20 where the Court held unconstitutional a
congressional attempt to overrule Miranda v. Arizona. 121 In
numerous cases decided between Miranda and Dickerson, the
Court had held that the Miranda warnings were not required by
the fifth amendment, but rather were a judicially created tool
designed to enforce the amendment. 122
In Dickerson, the
government argued that if Miranda warnings were, indeed, not
constitutionally required, the Constitution did not prevent
116. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution,
111 HARv. L. REV. 56, 66 (1996).
117. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 877, 894 (1996).
118. See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1 (1975).
119. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114
HARv. L. REV. 26 (2000).
120. 530 U.s. 428 (2000).
121. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
122. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.s. 433, 444 (1974); New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 539, 654 (1984); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528
(1987).
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Congress from overriding them. The Court soundly rejected this
claim.
Someone who thinks that the Court's only source of authority
comes from the Constitution will have considerable difficulty
understanding this result. If the Constitution does not require
Miranda warnings, and if the Court's only power derives from the
Constitution, it would seem to follow syllogistically that the Court
lacks the power to invalidate a statute permitting the introduction
of confessions prohibited by Miranda.
The result in Dickerson makes perfect sense as soon as one
acknowledges that the Court also has authority to promulgate
doctrine that is supplemental to and different from the commands
of the Constitution itself.
Doctrine is supplemental to the
Constitution because, taken by themselves, the Constitution's
commands are too porous and general to be instantiated in
everyday life. For example, as the pre-Miranda Court discovered,
the constitutional requirement of noncoercion is a philosophical
abstraction that is a poor substitute for the kind of clear rule that
lower courts and countless police officials need when they go about
their daily work.'23 Doctrinal elaboration is necessary to mediate
between legal abstractions on the one hand and the endless
complexity and variety of individual cases on the other.
However, constitutional doctrine is also different from, and
therefore in real tension with, the Constitution. AB I have argued
elsewhere, much of the Constitution's power derives from its
majestic incoherence. 124 The ideals of equality, freedom, and
dignity that the Constitution embodies are powerful precisely
because they can never be given concrete expression. They are
contradictory and allusive poetic evocations, not bureaucratic
rules. When the Supreme Court converts them into the kind of
directives necessary to run the vast bureaucracy that is the United
States, the Justices must necessarily be concerned with
extraconstitutional issues like administrability, coherence, and
comprehensibili ty.
Constitutional doctrine is therefore both more elaborate and
less flexible than the Constitution itself. More importantly for
present purposes, the source of constitutional doctrine cannot be
the Constitution. This fact is a necessary consequence of the
reasons we need doctrine in the first place. If the Constitution
were self-implementing we would not need the doctrine; because it
is not self-implementing, judges must look outside the
Constitution for the tools that will implement it.

123. For discussion of this problem, see Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and
Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 742 (1992).
124. See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW
DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 10-11 (2001).
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B. Doctrine, Secrecy, and Choice
The preceding section is designed to demystify an authentic
political question doctrine by demonstrating that the Supreme
Court, regularly and without much controversy, disregards
constitutional requirements. A natural response to this argument
is to point out that it is parasitic on a contestable conception of the
boundary between constitutional law on the one hand and politics
on the other.
A less formal, more capacious definition of
constitutional law avoids the charge that the Court regularly
disregards this law. For example, if one defines constitutional law
as consisting of constitutional doctrine as developed by the
Supreme Court, or as itself requiring respect for stare decisis or an
appropriate balance between enforcement and nonenforcement of
fourth amendment norms, then the Court is obeying, rather than
flouting constitutional commands. Conversely, a narrow enough
definition of "politics" rescues the Court from the charge that it
has confused political with constitutional judgments.
For
example, if one defines "politics" to mean the kind of partisan
politics that elected officials regularly engage in, none of my
examples demonstrate that the Court has made political
judgments.
Although there is some force to this argument, it mostly
misses the point.
My position does not depend upon the
specification of any particular boundary between constitutional
law and politics. Rather, it depends only on the assumption that
some such boundary exists. If we define constitutional law to
encompass everything that the Supreme Court does, then of course
the Court never allows politics to intrude on its constitutional
judgments. But a definition of constitutionalism that is this broad
deprives the word of any useful meaning. As soon as we entertain
the possibility that something lies outside the domain of
constitutionalism, then it will inevitably be true that the Court
will face a choice between doing what the Constitution commands
and doing something else.
For example, suppose one were to say that the Constitution
requires a "reasonable" level of enforcement of fourth amendment
rights. If what one means by this is simply an "all things
considered" judgment about how much enforcement there should
be, then of course the level of enforcement is controlled by
constitutional law. But constitutional law defined this broadly no
longer constitutes a useful analytic category. The Constitution
has meaning only if, at least occasionally, it requires that we do
something that we would not otherwise have done. And as soon ,as
we narrow the domain of constitutional law so as to give it
meaning, courts will be confronted with the problem of whether to
do what the Constitution commands or what they otherwise would
have done. For example, they will be confronted with the problem
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of what level of fourth amendment violation is "reasonable." This
residual category need not consist of politics in the partisan sense.
But it is politics in the sense that the outcomes it produces cannot
be justified within the domain of constitutionalism. However
constitutional law is defined, it will always make sense to allow
some violations of that law to go unremedied, and the Constitution
cannot, without contradiction, establish when it should be
violated.
There is another sense, though, in which the specific
examples I have used are within the domain of constitutionalism.
The examples look like constitutional law because they are,
themselves, heavily doctrinalized. It is thus easy to assimilate
them into normal constitutionalism. In contrast, the real political
question doctrine can never be completely normalized. This is so
because, at bottom, the doctrine reflects the brute and frightening
reality of unmediated and uncontrollable choice. The very act of
bringing this choice into consciousness denies the existence of
choice. As soon as the Justices recognize the possibility of
unmediated freedom, they inevitably attempt to justify the path
they have chosen. But justification implies structure and limits,
and structure and limits are incompatible with raw freedom.
It follows that we can never see the real political question
doctrine at work. What we see, instead, is the indirect evidence of
its existence, left over from the brief instant between its coming
into consciousness and the frantic effort at control. Thus, it is no
coincidence that the "law" of stare decisis and remedy is highly
developed and structured and that doctrinal elaboration is just
that-doctrine. True, we can demonstrate that attempting to root
these phenomena in the Constitution yields logical contradiction.
It is this contradiction that provides the indirect evidence that
there is a real political question lurking below the surface. In
contrast, the surface manifestations-phenomena like stare
decisis, remedy, and doctrinal elaboration-are just more
examples of the repression and denial that is constitutional law.
We can nonetheless catch fleeting and indirect evidence of
secret political questions if we focus on the evasive maneuvers
undertaken at the moment when the possibility of true choice
emerges. A good example is provided by a recent, provocative
article by Oren Gross concerning the appropriate legal response to
•
125
emergencIes.
Writing in the aftermath of the attack on the World Trade
Center, Gross carefully examines, and ultimately rejects, the two
standard responses to grave national crisis. According to the
"Business as Usual Model," there are no special emergency

125. See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises
Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003).
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powers. Instead, on this view, the system already grants the
government adequate powers, and any departure from regular
legality endangers the entire constitutional structure. 126 Gross
believes that this model risks "inflexible, dogmatic utopianism."127
It is simply a hard fact that governments faced with true
emergencies will not abide by ordinary legal norms, and an
ostrach-like insistence that this is not, or should not, be true risks
hypocrisy and the wholesale pollution of those norms even in
periods of normal politics.
The conventional rival to the "Business as Usual Model" is
the "Model of Accommodation." According to this model, the
government possesses extraordinary legal power to deal with
extraordinary circumstances. Properly read, the Constitution
requires the maintenance of ordinary norms to the extent that
these norms are practical, but also allows for extraordinary
measures to the extent that these measures are necessary. 128
Gross attacks this model because its "flexibility is innately
susceptible to manipulation" and because "[clhanges to the legal
system, in times of emergency under [this modell have the
tendency to become permanent features beyond the termination of
the crisis."l29
In place of these conventional approaches, Gross defends an
"Extra-Legal Measures Model." According to this model, we
should frankly recognize the legitimacy of government officials
sometimes violating the law when necessary to avoid catastrophe.
Perhaps paradoxically, a straightforward recognition of, and public
debate about, extra-legal measures will better protect civil
liberties than an attempt to remain within the four corners of our
normal constitutional system. l30
Gross's article is careful, learned, thoughtful, and closely
argued. Yet it is ultimately wrongheaded. The basic problem is
that he fails to accomplish his principal task: to spell out what a
truly Extra-Legal Model would look like and how it would work.
Gross gives the game away when he writes, late in the article, that
his approach "must be carefully limited and well-restricted lest it
be interpreted as permitting official lawlessness."131 Pursuant to
this requirement, Gross meticulously sets forth a series of rules for
the application of the model. Government's may deviate from
constitutional norms, but only if (1) the deviation is "aimed at the
advancement of the public good;"132 (2) it is "openly, candidly and
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

1043.
1096.
1059-64.
1096-97.
1021-22.
1107.
1111.
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fully disclosed to the public;,,133 (3) the actions are ratified ex post
by the public;134 and (4) if the public instead denounces the actions
or remains silent, government officials are vulnerable to civil or
criminal sanctions. 135 These rules, Gross insists, "ensure that
public officials are not above the law."136
The problem with this formulation should be apparent. If
Gross were truly defending extralegal measures, he would hardly
worry that his project might be misinterpreted as "permitting
official lawlessness" or as placing "public officials ... above the
law." Justifying official lawlessness and placing government
officials above the law is the whole point of an Extra Legal Model.
Instead of defending extra-legal conduct, Gross has merely
redefined what should count as legal.
A useful thought experiment that tests this proposition is to
attempt to draft a constitutional amendment that incorporates
Gross' proposal. Without going through the exercise here, I will
simply assert that any moderately competent lawyer would have
little trouble in drafting such an amendment. But if this is true, it
follows that Gross has simply proposed an interpretation of the
Constitution that incorporates such an amendment.
This
interpretation is no different from the accommodationist model
that he elsewhere attacks. Put differently, Gross has fallen into
the faux political question trap. His Extra-Legal Model is not
extra-legal at all, but instead a proposal to change the substantive
content of constitutional law.
To be sure, there is a way out of this trap, but it only leads
into another. Perhaps the point is that government officials
should be told that they are acting illegally even if, in some sense,
they are not. Like the position that Bickel attacks Justice Black
for adopting, and then, perhaps, adopts himself,137 Gross wants to
manipulate public officials by misleading them. Just as we set a
55 mile per hour speed limit to get drivers to go 60 miles per hour,
so too we should pretend that the law is stricter than it in fact is so
as to secure an optimal level of compliance.
I must confess that I am unsure whether Gross embraces this
argument. There are passages in his defense of the Extra Legal
Model that seem to invoke it,138 but, as I read him, he also attacks
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1111-12.
135. Id. at 1112.
136. Id.
137. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
138. Thus, Gross argues that "[tlhe knowledge that acting in a certain way
means acting unlawfully is likely to have a significant restraining effect on
government agents even during the emergency itself.... [Ilt seems likely that
the mere need to cross the threshold of illegality would serve, in and of itself,
as a limiting factor against a governmental rush to assume unnecessary
powers." Gross, supra note 125, at 1122.
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advocates of the Business as Usual Model for relying upon it.139 If
Gross does indeed mean to endorse this position, he falls into the
same difficulty that Bickel encountered: one cannot both withhold
from government officials the knowledge that their conduct is
actually lawful, and also candidly admit that one is withholding
this knowledge. Gross' acknowledgment that officials should not
really be held to the formal legal standards is like a speed limit
sign that says "55 miles per hour, but (to tell the truth) we won't
actually stop you if you are going 60."
Why has a scholar as perceptive and original as Professor
Gross fallen into these difficulties? The answer, I think, is simple.
Had he not, he would have had no article to write. There are two
problems. I have already spelled out the first of these in the
previous paragraph: Gross does not know how to keep a secret.
When Bickel faced this dilemma, he remained silent (that is, if my
speculation about him is correct). Gross has spilled the beans.
The second problem is more serious. Any article defending
the Extra Legal Model requires some description of what it is and
some norms for when it can be invoked. But as soon as the model
is structured in this way, it ceases to be extra-legal. What makes
conduct extra legal is precisely its resistance to rules and norms. 140
Without a recognition of this fact, one is led into an infinite
regress. In a true emergency, one might ask, are not government
officials justified in overriding the rules that Gross establishes for

139. [d. at 1044 (discussing the charge of hypocrisy directed against
advocates of The Business As Usual Model).
140. In his insightful analysis of the work of Carl Schmitt, Gross seems to
recognize as much. See Oren Gross, The Normless and Exceptionless
Exception: Carl Schmitt's Theory of Emergency Powers and the "Norm·
Exception" Dichotomy, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1825, 1841 (2000) (discussing the
"normless character of the exception").
Gross strongly criticizes Schmitt, a German political thinker who embraced
the Nazi regime, for nihilism because of Schmitt's recognition that "a decision
emerges out of nothing, . .. does not presuppose any given set of norms,
and ... does not owe its validity or its legitimacy to any preexisting normative
structure." [d. at 1851-52. Of course, it is for just this reason that we feel the
need to repress the possibility of making such decisions. Repression does not
make the possibility go away, however.
At the conclusion of his essay, Gross adds these words:
There are times when academics do not enjoy the privilege of not taking
sides and not expressing positions. And when they do, their words and
actions matter and they stand accountable for them. Carl Schmitt
expressed his positions clearly and acted upon them. All those who
continue to debate his legacy must remember at all times that this is not
some exercise conducted in the ivory towers of academia with which we
are involved. It is a matter of life, and even more so, of death.
[d. at 1867-68. Just so. And, one might add (although Gross surely would
not), it is precisely for this reason that preexisting legal norms can never fully
shield us from the terrible possibility of choice and from moral accountability
for the choice we make.

HeinOnline -- 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 475 2003-2004

476

The John Marshall Law Review

[37:441

rule violation? But if there are rules that govern this departure,
might not those rules, too, be overridden? At the bottom of the
chain is the terrifying possibility of un mediated choice that cannot
be contained by rules. To describe the circumstances when such
choice is appropriate is to insist on the very rules that are being
overridden.
If Professor Gross cannot defend an extralegal model within
the relative freedom of the law review format, then it is surely
expecting too much to suppose that the Justices would defend it in
the highly stylized and constricting language of judicial opinions.
And, of course, the Justices have not. Perhaps the best example of
this failure can be found in the very decisions establishing judicial
supremacy. Marbury is usually treated as the central pillar of our
commitment to law over politics. In fact Marbury-or at least
what Marbury has come to stand for-is a victory of politics over
constitutional law.
Consider the supposed obligation of other political actorslower court judges, the President, or the governor of a state, for
example-to follow Supreme Court precedent. As Edwin Meese,
among others has pointed out, this obligation elevates hierarchical
order over constitutional principle. 141
In cases where the
Constitution and orders of the Supreme Court conflict, political
actors are required to obey the latter rather than the former.
There may be good reasons for this requirement. For example,
Fred Schauer and Larry Alexander have argued that the demands
of predictability and uniformity argue strongly for judicial
supremacy.142 Perhaps they are right, but the important point
here is that these demands are not rooted in the Constitution. On
the contrary, they provide reasons why the Constitution ought not
be followed.
Moreover, the reasons cannot be spoken. It is therefore no
surprise that in Cooper v. Aaron,143 the most famous argument for
judicial supremacy, the Court not only failed to notice the conflict
between constitutionalism and judicial power; it actually conflated
the twO. 144 It could hardly be otherwise. The Cooper Court could
141. Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TuL. L. REV. 979, 983
(1987).
142. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial
Constitutional Intepretation, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1359, 1371-81 (1997).
143. 358 U.s. 1 (1958).
144. According to the Cooper Court, its own interpretation of the
Constitution simply was the supreme law of the land. Id. at 18.
For a more recent example of the conflation, and the contradiction it produces,
consider the position of Alabama Attorney General Bill Pryor regarding the
removal of a monument to the Ten Commandments from the lobby of the state
Supreme Court building. According to Pryor, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court was within his constitutional rights when he installed the monument.
See For Pryor, Religious and Legal Rights in Conflict, THE WASH. POST, Aug
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not recognize the anticonstitutional nature of judicial supremacy
while also insisting on the obligation of all political actors to obey
the Constitution. Nor could it paint itself as standing against
anarchic and lawless assertions of power while admitting that its
own decision amounted to such an assertion.
Still, the fact that choice cannot be described or defended does
not mean that it does not exist .. There is nothing inevitable about
the way that power is exercised. Try as we might to deny the
terrifying reality, there is always the possibility of choice. We can
never bring this brute fact fully into consciousness, but neither can
we ever fully repress it.
Like the quantum particles that
Heisenberg tried to measure, the political question doctrine can
never quite be grasped. We know that it is there, but the effort to
capture it transforms it into something tamer and less
consequential.

III.

POLITICAL QUESTIONS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

In this brief, concluding section, I want to explore some of the
implications my analysis holds for the problem of judicial review.
One implication is fairly obvious: the Marbury argument for
judicial power, which emphasizes the apolitical nondiscretionary
nature of the judicial function, will not withstand analysis. Of
course, this is hardly news. To the extent that I have anything
important to add to the Marbury debunking industry, it is only
that the necessary secrecy of the political question doctrine may
explain, even if it does not justifY, the logical fallacies in
Marshall's opinion.
The second implication is more counterintuitive. The secret
political question doctrine undermines not just Marbury's
argument, but also the argument of Marbury's critics, who would
vest some or all interpretive authority in the political branches.

A. The Marbury Fallacy
Chief Justice Marshall's strategy in Marbury was to recognize
a category of cases as posing political questions and then to bound
and marginalize the category with legal doctrine.
As the
preceding analysis demonstrates, the strategy cannot work. To
the extent that the political question doctrine defines a legal
category, it is indeed marginal because it contains virtually no
cases. Cases apparently within the category are almost always

25,2003, at A05. Pryor nonetheless also favored the removal of the monument
after it was declared illegal by federal courts because "The rule of law means
that no person, including the Chief Justice of Alabama, is above the law." [d.
It apparently did not occur to Pryor that "the rule of law" might require giving
more weight to the Constitution than to an erroneous judicial interpretation of
the Constitution.
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better understood as decisions on the merits. To the extent that
the category is nonlegal, it cannot be controlled or defined by the
law. It is therefore simply a nonsequitur to insist, as Marshall
does, that "[i]f some acts be examinable and others not, there must
be some rule of law to guide the court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. ,,145
Nor will it do to claim that "lilt is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.",46 One
might better assert that it is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department not to say when it is disobeying the law.
In truth, however, the language of "province and duty" are simply
out of place. Judges are regularly confronted with ethical choice,
and, as Bernard Williams has effectively argued, "province and
duty" cannot define the ethical domain. '47
But although the opinion is not defensible, one can, perhaps,
understand what Marshall did in Marbury. Here, we come back to
the ironies and contradictions at Marbury's core. For reasons I
have already spelled out, Marshall could not openly acknowledge
the politics that drove the result. Marbury did, indeed "make" a
political question, and, for just that reason, the explicit, legal
answer to that question had to be nonresponsive. Whether the
ultimate outcome of Marbury is right or wrong cannot be
determined by legal analysis. The answer to that question
necessarily lies outside the realm oflaw.

B. The Problem for Marbury's Critics
For a similar set of reasons, the political question doctrine
poses an important difficulty for Marbury's modern critics. I have
already addressed many of the claims of moderate critics. These
critics would reject the kind of judicial imperialism that Marbury
has come to stand for, but not a core judicial function to at least
sometimes "say what the law is." As I have already argued, the
effort to bound the domain of judicial review without taking a
position on the merits of the claims being asserted is extremely
difficult and, perhaps, impossible.
The more interesting problem is posed by Marbury's radical
critics. In an influential and important book, my colleague and
sometimes coauthor, Mark Tushnet has argued that we should
take the Constitution "away from the courts" and vest all
interpretive authority in the political branches. 148 I will not
advance here anything like the complete analysis that his theory

145. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165.
146. Id. at 177.
147. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 7-8
(1985).
148. TUSHNET, supra note 46.
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deserves. Instead, I will limit myself to a discussion of how that
theory intersects with secret political questions.
To some extent, Tushnet's position on the vesting of
interpretive authority is entangled with his views about the merits
of constitutional law. Tushnet defends a "thin" substantive
Constitution that protects no more than the overall goals of the
Constitution's preamble and the Declaration of Independence. 149 It
does not require. extended argument to establish that this
Constitution is thin, indeed 150_SO thin that like Dashiell
Hammett's Thin Man, it may not exist at all. Virtually any action
taken by the political branches could be justified under this
version of constitutional law.
Because these substantive
requirements constrain so little, Tushnet's position may be
reducible to that of defenders of the faux political question
doctrine: the political branches are not answerable to courts, but
only because courts will find virtually everything that the political
branches do within their constitutional powers.
Tushnet concedes that the thin constitution constrains very
little, but he denies that it constrains not at all. 151 If his thin
constitution indeed yields determinate outcomes, it makes a
difference that final judgment regarding those outcomes is vested
in the political branches. The natural question that then arises is
why one should favor this allocation of power. Tushnet offers a
book-length defense, which I will not summarize here. The
important point is that this defense cannot be from within
constitutional law. As Tushnet candidly acknowledges, it must
instead be a political defense, grounded in a set of contestable
political goals that are more likely to be accomplished by political
actors than by judges. 152 But of course, the trouble with such a
political defense is that it will only be persuasive to people who
start out sharing the same political position.l53 To the extent that
constitutional arrangements are intended to appeal to people with
different political positions, Tushnet's argument is bound to fail.
There is a more serious problem. Suppose we take Tushnet's
political aims as a given. Why would one suppose that tinkering
with the distribution of power between courts and legislatures is
the best means to achieve those aims? Perhaps Tushnet's claim is
149. [d. at 11-13.
150. Saikrashyna B. Prakash characterizes it as "anorexic." Saikrashyna B.
Prakash, American Aristocracy, 109 YALE L.J. 541, 543 (1999).
151. See TuSHNET, supra note 46, at 14.
152. [d. at 129-53.
153. This fact is no less true because the political positions are characterized
in terms of "self governance"-a central concern of Tushnet's book. Self
governance, like the thin Constitution itself, is subject to many rational, but
contestable interpretations. Institutional arrangements favoring legislatures
or courts will be attractive depending upon which contestable interpretation
one adopts.

HeinOnline -- 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 479 2003-2004

480

The John Marshall Law Review

[37:441

simply empirical. As many other scholars have demonstrated, it is
surely true that the Supreme Court, over the sweep of its history,
has not usually been a force for the kind of progressive change
that Tushnet (and I) favor. l54 But a purely empirical argument
provides no reason to suppose that this history need be endlessly
repeated. The secret political question doctrine teaches us that
judges need only choose differently-or we need only choose to
appoint judges who would choose diffeqmtly-to produce
completely different outcomes.
Of course, Tushnet might respond that we are unlikely to
have such judges any time soon. He is surely right on that score.
But neither are we likely to see the political branches take the
Constitution away from the courts any time soon. Political actors
who had the will and ability to accomplish this goal would also
have the will and ability to appoint judges who would make the
goal unnecessary.
Perhaps Tushnet thinks that the problem is not with- the
kinds of people who become judges, but with the nature of the task
they are asked to perform. On this view, it is more than simply an
empirical fact that judges have, historically, behaved in a certain
fashion. There is something about the legal exercise itself that
leads to such behavior. We must therefore take the Constitution
away from the courts because the Constitution itself-understood
as law-is the enemy. Perhaps the thin constitution is attractive
precisely because it is not law in the usual sense, and political
enforcement of that constitution is attractive just because it is not
legal enforcement.
If this is Tushnet's point, then the attractiveness of his
position will turn on one's taste for the competing virtues of
freedom and constraint. I have only two points to add to a
discussion of this topic. First, judges, as well as politicians, retain
the possibility of freedom. Indeed, as I have tried to show, the
very assertion of judicial power is an act of unmediated freedom.
Second, because this possibility of freedom goes all the way to the
bottom, our own choice between judicial and political
constitutionalism poses a secret political question.

154. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERT, HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE (1991); Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great about
Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 145, 191 (1998).
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